Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular pronounced in non-democracies, i.e., military academies have diverse effects across regime types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil-military relations. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge, predominantly in authoritarian states.
Introduction
performance, as well as to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces. But despite the obvious beneficial implications associated with military academies, we suggest that there can also be a negative side effect stemming from such institutions. Erdoğan's response to the failed coup attempt was quick and forceful: thousands of people were arrested or purged, including judges, teachers, police officers, civil servants, as well as numerous military officers and other personnel. Importantly, only a few days after the putsch attempt, on July 31, the Turkish government announced that it would close all military academies in the country. 5 The Turkish military has traditionally perceived itself as a protector and guarantor of But what are the precise mechanisms behind the relationship of military academies and coups?
Is there systematic evidence for the presence of military academies increasing the risk of a coup?
And how do contextual factors such as regime type potentially moderate such an effect? The
Turkish case highlights the importance of investigating the institutions and characteristics of military professionalism and how they could facilitate the staging of a coup d'état. However, the role of academies remains largely unexplored. Previous work identified a number of factors that influence the military's disposition and capacity to stage a coup. Concerning motives, key influences include structural variables capturing governments' legitimacy crises and political instability, or the military's grievances and the defense of its (unmet) corporate interests (e.g., Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 1977; Londregan and Poole 1990; Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Thyne 2010; Roessler 2011; Powell 2012; Leon 2014; Bell and Sudduth 2017) .
The study of the factors driving the capacity to coordinate a putsch is more limited. Thompson (1976) stresses the role of organizational cohesion, using the involvement of senior officers in coups as a proxy. However, he does not directly identify what spurs cohesion and allows officers to coordinate in the first place. Thus, scholars have mostly focused on obstacles that hinder coordination such as international conflict (Arbatli and Arbatli 2016; Piplani and Talmadge 2016) , the size of the military (Powell 2012) , and, especially, structural coup-proofing strategies (e.g., Feaver 1999; Quinlivan 1999) . Some find that counterbalancing, entailing the fragmentation of the security forces into multiple military and paramilitary units, reduces coup risk (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012; Böhmelt and Pilster 2016; Albrecht and Eibl 2018; but also, De Bruin 2017) .
Previous works have difficulties in identifying organizational factors that shape a military's preferences and facilitate coordination. This research fills this gap by focusing on the impact of military academies on the risk of coup attempts. First, in an unconditional setup, we argue that military academies may increase the risk of coups through two mechanisms. On one hand, education through academies creates, inculcates, and strengthens a set of cohesive and shared preferences, views, and corporate identity amongst military personnel, which could go against the actions, policies, or ideas of incumbent governments. On the other hand, academies contribute to establish and foster networks of trust among military officers. Such trust-based relationships, in turn, facilitate coordination and the revelation of information, both necessary for plotting and executing a coup. Second, we also develop an argument for a conditional hypothesis. In democracies, military schools may emphasize more the importance of civilian control of militaries and the norm against military intervention in politics as core principles underlying democratic institutions. In dictatorships, leaders are more likely to pursue particularistic interests, and have stronger incentives to limit the autonomy of the military and interfere in promotion and recruitment practices. Additionally, the secrecy and trust that personal networks enable become all the more important for successful plotting in more repressive contexts. This implies that the negative side effects of military academies might be more pronounced in non-democracies. The next section reviews the literature on the general relationship between military professionalism and civil-military relations. We then develop our unconditional theoretical argument in two steps, before developing the claim that regime type moderates the impact of military academies on coup risk. After describing the data, variables, and methods, we discuss the main findings. The final section concludes and discusses the research's implications for both policymakers and future studies.
Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations
There are two general views about the relationship between military professionalism and civilmilitary relations. On one hand, Huntington (1957) defines military professionalism as the armed forces being "a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics," focused on the management of violence and maintaining control over their own education and promotion systems. Importantly, Huntington (1957: 71-78) hypothesizes that professionalism would render the military politically neutral and prevent it from intervening in politics: "the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values." 6 On the other hand, Finer (1962: 20-26) argues that military professionalism might push officers toward intervening in politics in opposition to the incumbent government. He outlines three mechanisms: professionalism makes the military to perceive itself as serving a more abstract notion of the state as opposed to the government currently in power; a sense of professionalism pushes the military into confrontations with the incumbent over recruitment, promotion, or equipment issues; and, finally, professionalism creates a desire in the military to avoid being used in oppressing domestic opponents. Scholars have correspondingly sought to unpack professionalism into its various elements to shed more light on this apparent contradiction. Stepan (1973) , for instance, claims that professionalization in the armed forces may orient them around internal (i.e., political stability and development) or external threats (i.e., other states). A military whose professionalism is defined vis-à-vis internal dangers is then more likely to intervene in politics. Nordlinger (1977) distinguishes between three dimensions of military professionalism: autonomy from civilian interference, exclusiveness as the sole armed force in a country, and expertise in the administration of violence. The effect of expertise, the dimension most relevant to our research, on the military's propensity to intervene in politics is not clearly identified, though. On one hand, a focus on the acquisition of military expertise may keep the armed forces away from intervening in politics. On the other hand, military officers could be tempted to transfer parts of their expertise, such as managerial skills, into civilian governance, thus increasing coup risk. Also, expertness usually increases their power and capacity vis-à-vis the government.
7 Similarly, Bellin (2004 Bellin ( : 145, 2012 contends that institutionalized militaries, as opposed to patrimonialized ones, tend to be "rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic," with "established paths of career advancement and recruitment" and with a corporate identity separate from the regime. Moreover, "under these conditions, the military elite will be able to imagine separation from the regime and life beyond the regime" (Bellin 2012: 133) , which may lead them to oppose the government.
Other studies investigate the effects of military education on civil-military relations. Quinlivan (1999: 151ff) which "implies a concern with the maintenance of hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness within the military; autonomy from civilian intervention in postings and promotions; and budgets sufficient to attract high-quality recruits and buy state-of-the-art weapons" (Geddes 2003: 54) .
Such preferences may raise confrontations with the incumbent government when the latter's actions encroach on the military's corporate interests and autonomy (Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 1977 Stepan (1971 Stepan ( , 1973 claims that academies in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, e.g., those in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, promoted a new doctrine of national security, which advocated an active and expanded political role of the army that led, for instance, to the 1964 coup in Brazil. Related to this, some suggest that education and training in academies may foster a sense of moral and even intellectual superiority among officers (Nunn 1972 (Nunn , 1975 . The military might well perceive itself as serving more superior values as opposed to the government's partisan and narrower goals (Finer 1962) , thereby feeling skilled, competent, and compelled (as patriotic saviors) to intervene to redress undesirable situations brought about by "corrupt" civilian politicians (Nordlinger 1977 coordination is a critical requirement in the planning and implementation of a coup (Geddes 1999; Böhmelt and Pilster 2016; Böhmelt, Pilster, and Tago 2017) . Participants in contentious collective action usually face a high risk of discovery and punishment. Plotting demands secrecy and trust.
To avoid detection, to reveal their (true) preferences to other potential conspirators, to bring enough participation into the plot, to coordinate their actions, and to maximize their chances of success, individuals engaged in different forms of contentious collective action need to strongly depend on others they trust. As a result, mobilization for such endeavors often relies on pre-existent personal networks that do create strong ties and relations of trust (e.g., Siegel 2009; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980) . and by facilitating threshold calculations (Petersen 2001) . With regard to the latter, community 10 For an analysis of the role of networks in military defections during the Syrian conflict, see Koehler, Ohl, and Albrecht (2016) . Gould's (1991) study of the 1871's uprising of the "Commune of Paris" demonstrates that mobilization was, among others, based on pre-existing social networks. In her study of militant female Palestinian networks in 1980s Lebanon, Parkinson (2013) shows how important trust-based quotidian networks were for mobilization, especially once the Israeli counterinsurgents had severed formal command and control structures. Finally, Staniland (2014: 23ff) argues that insurgent organizations are built on the basis of their leaders' pre-existing social networks. In nascent insurgent groups, leaders have to appropriate already existent networks during a time of state repression and uncertainty over the organization's persistence.
norms allow individuals to form beliefs about the number of individuals likely to participate in a rebellion, thus facilitating the assessment whether they can find "safety in numbers" against state repression.
Just like an insurgency, a military coup is a high-risk endeavor marred by the various problems faced in the organization of contentious collective action. We argue that the necessary networks and bonds that aid coordination among coup-plotters are likely to be established and emerge during the years of training in military academies. Although some officers may share a preference for intervening, initial disaffected plotters still need to approach and share their views and intentions with other fellow officers with the aim of persuading and mobilizing them. During the planning phase, the core group of conspirators then needs to ensure the participation of core military units, preferably those stationed in or around the capital. At the same time, conspirators must avoid the scrutiny of the government's security services that are, especially in coup-prone countries, usually on the watch-out for disloyal officers (Nordlinger 1977: 100; Singh 2014: 108-109) . Recruitment is thus risky, with detection possibly resulting in arrest, dismissal, the loss of military rank, or worse. As Luttwak (2016: 80) emphasizes, the natural calculus of an officer approached to participate in a coup would be to report it to government authorities.
In light of this, consider the role of military academies. Prospective officers attend military schools at the beginning of their careers. The time in the military academy is the first -and likely most defining − part of officer cadets' "institutional lives," during which their identity as a professional soldier is systematically built up in order to transcend other social or ethnic identities (Janowitz 1977: 146-147) . Pre-existing networks of trust between officers are central for solving the problem of whom coup plotters can approach for two reasons. First, shared beliefs and values transmitted during training make it less difficult for plotters to approach and persuade other fellow officers into action (or acquiescence) as they are more likely to share a similar view on current circumstances -as outlined with our first argument. Second, such networks allow plotters to communicate their plans securely to other officers without risking being betrayed (Luttwak 2016 Singh's (2014: 21) words, "the most important consideration in an actor's decision calculus is to support the side he believes everybody else will support, and military strength flows accordingly to that side."
are usually one, if not the central location, where future officers form a "cohesive body" (Barnett 1967: 22) and relationships of trust (Siebold 2007) . For officer cadets, the time in the military academy typically constitutes a time of intense bonding, creating life-long ties of trust (Dornbusch 1955) , which are fungible for collective action, more generally, and for the plotting and executing military coups in particular. Stepan (1971: 53) 
A Conditional Effect of Military Academies: Regime Types
We also argue for and empirically test a conditional hypothesis: the theory assumes so far that Horowitz 1985; Feaver 1999; Quinlivan 1999; Roessler 2011; Sudduth 2017) .
Second, personal networks of trust among military officers are scarcer under more repressive regimes. This, in turn, could enhance the importance of the networks military academies inevitably create. Not only the risk of detection is higher in non-democracies due to the intense scrutiny of the regime, but so is the severity of punishment. Also, autocrats actively seek to hinder coordination within the armed forces not only by undermining hierarchy and creating parallel chains of command (Böhmelt and Pilster 2016) , but also by using infiltrated personnel, informers, military internal intelligence units, and political commissariats (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982; Barany 1991 ). Under such conditions, an atmosphere of mistrust may easily spread among officers.
The trust that networks created in military academies provide become all the more necessary and critical for the successful plotting and execution of a coup under autocracy
In addition to these two channels, another mechanism specific to democracies further contributes to the impact of academies being less significant under democracy. According to Stepan (1988: 143), "[w] here the military is a part of the state apparatus and has a markedly different idea about the nature of democratic politics and the legitimate role of the military than that held by the leaders of the government, this can be a major source of intrastate division. The executive team of the state apparatus will then, at some time, have to play an active role in monitoring and reshaping military resocialization." One possibility is to close academies such as Turkey's Erdoğan announced and the executive did with ESEDENA in post-transition Uruguay (Stepan 1988: 143 Standard errors are clustered by country to control for intra-group correlations such as idiosyncratic path dependencies of states over time.
Explanatory Variables and Control Items
Our main explanatory variable is based on the number of active military academies in a given country-year, as coded by Toronto (2017 Figure 2 __________ Specifically, about three percent of our sample countries have never established a military academy (e.g., Albania), while 50 states (e.g., the US) in our sample (45 percent) have had at least one academy over the entire observation period. This leaves us with about 50 percent of countries in our sample that display variation in the establishment of military academies, i.e., there is an academy in some years, but not in others. The general spatio-temporal trends in our main explanatory variable are summarized in Figure 2 , which depicts the average degree of established military schools by regions over time. A level of 1, for example, means that all countries in a particular region have had a military academy in a specific year. In the appendix, we summarize models that omit those countries that always/never had a military academy and estimations based on a purely cross-sectional sample.
For the conditional hypothesis, we estimate models where we specify an interaction of Military Academy with variables on regime type. To this end, we create two regime type variables:
Autocracy and Democracy, with anocracies as the reference category. We employ data from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2004) and define democracies as those countries scoring a value of +6 or higher on the polity2 scale. Autocracies receive a value of -6 or lower in a specific year. As coups are generally less likely to break out in democracies than autocracies or anocracies,
we use Autocracy and Democracy as controls in the unconditional models, but interact them with
Military Academy for the test of the conditional hypothesis. For a final set of models, we divide our sample into democratic, autocratic, and anocratic country-years to examine whether the impact of military academies varies by regime type. Finally, we control for institutional coup-proofing or counterbalancing using the variable on the effective number of ground-combat compatible forces in Böhmelt (2011, 2012) . We also take into account the squared term of this variable in our estimations to model the likely curvilinear impact on the likelihood of a coup (Böhmelt and Pilster 2016) . Both variables,
Counterbalancing and Counterbalancing 2 , are lagged by one year. Table 1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of all variables discussed so far. The last column reports the variance inflation factors. Table 1 
__________

Empirical Results
The models of our analysis for the unconditional hypothesis are summarized in Table 2 , which presents three estimations. The first focuses on our core variable of interest only; while temporal controls are included, we omit the other explanatory variables discussed above. The second model includes most controls next to Military Academy and the variables for temporal autocorrelation, but we omit the counterbalancing variables as data for them are only available as of 1970.
Including Counterbalancing and its square term then limits our period under study significantly, as shown in Model 3 where the number of observations is notably lower. The entries in Table 2 are regular logit coefficients and, thus, only their signs and significance levels allow for a direct interpretation. Substantive quantities of interest are summarized in Figure 3 , where we plot the changes in the coup probabilities for a switch of Military Academy from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables constant at their medians. Table 5 presents the control variables' first differences, i.e., percentage-point changes in the predicted probability of a coup. Finally, the models for the conditional hypothesis are presented in Table 4 : Model 4 comprises the interaction of Military Academy with the regime-type items, while Models 5-7 focus on sub-samples of democracies, autocracies, and anocracies, respectively. As the multiplicative specification in Model 4 cannot be directly interpreted, Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities of coup risk given the (non-) establishment of military academies in either democracies or autocracies. Table 3 __________ Our argument underlying the unconditional hypothesis emphasizes that officers develop shared ideas and norms in academies that could challenge incumbent leaders. A second mechanism suggests that experiences at military academies build and foster networks among officers that then allow coordinating the organization of a coup more effectively. Given this rationale, there might be a temporal lag between when officers actually attend military academies and when a coup is attempted (see Singh 2014) . In a similar vein, some countries abolish their academies after some years, but the networks created there should persist; in any event, after officers leave the military academy, those mechanisms we argue for should prevail. Therefore, we examine different lag structures for the main variable, Military Academy. 14 For instance, coups from the middle of the military hierarchy make up the vast majority of coups (Singh 2014) , but, at a minimum, about ten years might be necessary for an individual who graduated from a military academy to be promoted to a position where he can take a leadership role in coordinating with other military officers in key positions to succeed in a putsch. And even in developing countries, becoming a battalion commander (usually associated with the rank of lieutenant colonel) requires at least 15 years after graduation. In light of these patterns, the non-existence of a military academy in a current year may not fully capture that military officers have low abilities and motivations to attempt a coup.
__________
We thus re-estimated Model 2 with different temporal lags for Military Academy. Table 3 summarizes the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and significance levels for Military Academy at these different temporal lags. 15 But as demonstrated there, the positive and significant effect of
Military Academy prevails at any temporal lag specified. Table 4 and Figure 4 
Coming to the conditional hypothesis suggesting that the impact of military academies on coup risk differs by regime type, we specify an interaction of Military Academy with Democracy and Autocracy, respectively. In addition, we also study different sub-samples of our data: autocracies only, democracies only, and anocracies only as defined by the binary regime-type variables. First,
Military Academy still exerts a positive and significant effect on coup attempts even when including interactions with Democracy and Autocracy in Model 4. To allow for a more direct interpretation, we plot predicted probabilities for the core scenarios of the multiplicative specification in Figure 4 . As demonstrated there, the significant effect holds for autocracies (anocracies as the baseline category) since the points estimates for Military Academy=0 and
Military Academy=1 are statistically different from each other and, (b) the estimate of the latter is also significantly different from Military Academy=1 in the case of democracies (as the confidence intervals do not overlap in either case). However, the effect stemming from military academies seems to be more weakly pronounced in democratic states: although the predicted probability of a coup increases when moving from 0 to 1 for Military Academy, the two scenarios' confidence intervals do overlap in the case of democracies.
Second, we further examine this by re-estimating Model 2 for the regime sub-samples in our data. As can be seen in Models 5-7, the unconditional effect of Military Academy identified above is particularly driven by non-democratic regimes: autocracies and anocracies. Mirroring what we report in Figure 4 , the coefficient estimate of Military Academy is statistically insignificant for the democracy-only sub-sample. Ultimately, this suggests that the negative externality stemming from those institutions is most strongly pronounced in non-democratic states (see also Stepan 1971) .
However, note that it cannot be derived from these findings that military academies reduce coup risk in democracies. In fact, neither is the finding pertaining to democracies negative nor is it statistically significant in any estimation. As such, military academies do not reduce coup risk in democratic regimes, but it seems they merely do not significantly affect the likelihood of a coup.
While this supports our conditional hypothesis as the effect of Military Academy does differ across forms of government, the insignificant finding for democracies can be explained along the following lines. As discussed, what is being taught at military academies may not be directly driven by whether the current regime in power is a democracy or not. The military, as an enduring institution, does not necessarily adjust to the regime type, but rather reflects its own ideology and self-understanding. Importantly, the results in Table 4 might also be driven by the fact that there is less variation on the dependent variable in the democratic sub-sample: there are 32 coup attempts in Model 5, but 99 and 93 in Model 6 and Model 7, respectively. Finally, the conditional hypothesis is likely to apply more to disposition component of our theoretical argument rather than the ability mechanism. This could induce that while military academies increase coup risk by teaching the importance of corporate interests that could go against the incumbent political regimes, they simultaneously reduce coup risk by teaching the importance of civilian control of the militaries and non-military intervention in politics, which leads to the overall insignificance of Military Academy in the democratic sub-sample as two competing mechanisms cancel each other out.
In terms of our controls, the findings in Tables 2 and 5 generally confirm previous results. We briefly discuss the statistically significant findings only. First, coups are less likely in democracies as compared to anocratic forms of government. Table 5 shows that this variable is linked to a decrease in coup risk of about 1.9 percentage points, mirroring our discussion of the variation on the dependent variable in Models 5-7. Autocratic regimes do not necessarily differ from anocracies, though, as depicted by the insignificant first difference in Table 5 . A higher level of instability induces a higher coup risk: raising Instability from its minimum to its maximum leads to an increase in coup risk of about 3.5 percentage points. Table 5 __________ Second, while GDP per capita is not significantly related to coup risk, Change GDP per capita is. In Model 3, our calculations suggest that the likelihood of a coup decreases by about 34
percentage points when moving Change GDP per capita from its minimum to its maximum.
Moreover, our findings support the claim that larger militaries are less coup-prone (Powell 2012 ):
Military Personnel is negatively signed and significant, while its first difference is estimated at a decrease of 4.7 percentage points. Soldier Quality, which rests on the same underlying theoretical mechanism, mirrors this and is even more substantive in size: the first difference is at -0.389.
Finally, Böhmelt and Pilster (2016) Based on our work, future studies may want to further explore the conditions under which the negative-externality effect of military academies is stronger or weaker. Our analysis based on the forms of government is arguably a step in this direction, but, for example, previous research also shows that the different services and branches of the military are associated with coup risk in diverse ways (e.g., Böhmelt, Pilster, and Tago 2017) . Further disaggregating the academy data in Toronto (2017) along army, navy, and air force seems an effort worth making. Likewise, how military academies are related to the outcome of coup attempts remains to be tested systematically, although the appendix presents preliminary evidence for a positive impact on coup success. In addition, our unconditional argument relies on two mechanisms, which may merit additional attention. Which of the two channels we have outlined is more influential in affecting the risk of a putsch? Most importantly, however, the finding that military academies are associated with a 29 higher likelihood of coups considered alongside the claim that these schools are a key indicator of professionalism in the armed forces sheds new light on the debate of how professionalism affects civil-military relations in general (Huntington 1957; Finer 1962 The variables for temporal correction are included, but omitted from the presentation. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed) Note: A first difference is the change in the probability that Coup Attempt=1 associated with a change from the minimum to the maximum value of a specific variable while holding all other covariates at their median. Counterbalancing and its square term are omitted due to the curvilinear impact on the outcome. The calculations are based on Model 3. 
